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1. Introduction.  
The chapter focuses on Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA (FD) on the transfer 
of sentenced persons in the EU and on the main challenges connected to its 
implementation across the EU
1
.  
This FD established a new approach to the transfer of prisoners among the 
Member States of the EU. As it is for many other EU acts concerning judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, it replaced the intergovernmental footprint of a 
pre-existing Convention of the Council of Europe. In fact, the 1983 Convention 
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons had received little attention and its limited 
application had proven to be unsatisfactory, mainly because of its lengthy and 
cumbersome formalities
2
. Therefore, FD 2008/909/JHA introduced an advanced 
mechanism of judicial cooperation, based on the paramount principles of mutual 
trust between national judicial authorities and of mutual recognition of foreign 
judicial decisions.  
In broad terms, the procedure laid down by this instrument is centered on the 
golden rule of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely the duty on the 
part of the receiving authority to recognize and enforce the request for transfer 
issued abroad. As such, the mechanism obliterates the role of the political branch, 
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minimizes unnecessary formalities and speeds up the procedure, mainly by 
imposing strict deadlines for issuing a decision on recognition. In addition, the FD 
reiterates two major recurring features of EU legislation in this domain: the 
abolition of the double criminality check in relation to a list of serious offences
3
 
and the provision of an exhaustive list of optional grounds for denying 
recognition
4
. 
However, notwithstanding the initial ambitions, ten years after its adoption this 
instrument is still stuck at the level of a promising young player showing 
auspicious potential for the years to come. Its practical application by the national 
judicial authorities is unsatisfactory
5
, although it is slowly increasing on a yearly 
basis, at least in some Member States
6
. The unexplored potential of transfer 
procedures has led to a very limited body of EU and national case law and has 
further fed the silence of legal scholars, who have devoted little attention to this 
FD so far, despite its remarkable theoretical knots. 
This state of the art is the outcome of several converging factors. Firstly, the 
implementation of the FD was belated in many Member States, most of which did 
not comply with the transposition deadline of December 2011
7
.  
Secondly, the wording of this act was the result of 3 long years of heated 
negotiations within the Council. The imminent entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty was actually the most effective boost to reach an agreement, with a view to 
adopt the proposed act before the eradication of the third pillar, thus preserving its 
intergovernmental nature
8
. This final rush led to inevitable compromises affecting 
the internal coherence
9
 and the conceptual accuracy of the act. On the one hand, 
according to the wording of the FD, transfer procedures must be directed to favour 
the sentenced person’s social rehabilitation10; on the other hand, a closer look 
unveils the managerial ambitions of the States, which are keen to add this 
procedure to the list of tools allowing for forms of control over and removal of 
unwanted EU migrants. The notion itself of social rehabilitation is far from clear 
and its elusiveness further blurs the scope and content of the duties of cooperation 
incumbent upon the issuing and the executing Member States.  
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Thirdly, FD 2008/909/JHA covers the criminal execution phase, which is one of 
the most delicate aspects of inter-State judicial cooperation procedures. The 
enforcement of a conviction is still nowadays perceived as a secret garden of the 
Member States, where the process of Europeanization of penal justice faces 
exclusive national competences. The limited room for EU intervention entails the 
absence of harmonization measures and a subsequent high degree of 
fragmentation of domestic legal orders, for instance in terms of variety of 
penitentiary benefits, alternatives to detention and related measures pursuing the 
goal of enhancing the inmate’s chances of a fruitful resocialization after 
conviction. Moreover, it has shaped the transfer mechanisms accordingly, by 
leading - inter alia - to a prominent role of the issuing authority as to the actual 
post-transfer regime the prisoner will be subject to
11
. 
Be it as it may, at the present stage several substantive and procedural hurdles 
pose stumbling blocks to the full effectiveness of this FD, from both quantitative 
(number of transfers) and qualitative (genuine attempt to pursue social 
rehabilitation goals) perspectives. Beyond mere effectiveness-centered arguments, 
this fragmented and magmatic context urges broader reflections on the actual grip 
of mutual recognition mechanisms. This is even more evident in an area where 
elusive notions of EU law, opposing theleological priorities and complex 
interrelationships between the quest for coherence at the supranational level and 
national legal fragmentation represent a favourable breeding ground for the many 
facets of the dark sides of mutual trust: mutual distrust, mutual mistrust, or even 
just a lack of confidence on the feasibility and usefulness of judicial cooperation 
procedures.  
In this scenario, while waiting for several national laws of implementation to be 
fully incorporated into the daily toolbox of the domestic judicial authorities, a 
closer look at the varied practice of the national judicial and governmental 
authorities could be a promising source of inspiration and - hopefully - solutions.  
As a matter of fact, mutual trust and mutual recognition are not confined in the 
realm of general principles. Harmonization of national laws has traditionally 
constituted their complementary half, but it is not an all-encompassing 
explanation of the inherent nature and functioning of judicial cooperation 
mechanisms across the Union. Instead, their fate is also driven by the silent engine 
of formal and informal operational cooperation between national police and 
judicial authorities. A varied set of tools facilitates everyday cooperation, by 
easing closer contacts with involved domestic authorities and contributing to 
reaching the goals set forth in the acts concerning the application of mutual 
recognition to given categories of judicial decisions. This is particularly true in 
those fields where no harmonization measures have been adopted at the EU level, 
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as it is for the criminal execution phase, including - for the purposes of the present 
analysis - the scope of application of FD 2008/909/JHA. 
Building on this broader context, this chapter considers how operational 
cooperation can amount to becoming a powerful fuel for mutual trust and mutual 
recognition, in particular in relation to cross-border transfers of prisoners.  
In order to do so, the analysis considers operational cooperation in broad terms, as 
an ensemble of rules and practices stemming from both EU law and national legal 
orders. In fact, the formal operational mechanisms established at the EU level are 
complemented by an extremely varied plethora of instruments and strategies 
developed by the domestic authorities, which contribute to the actual functioning 
of judicial cooperation mechanisms. The importance of this multifaceted 
undergrowth of measures in securing - or at least increasing - the effectiveness of 
EU law has been often neglected by legal scholars and calls for further attention. 
To this respect, this chapter builds on the study carried out in the framework of 
the EU funded research project RePers - Mutual Trust and Social Rehabilitation 
into Practice (2017-2019). The project focuses on the tools developed in Italy, 
Romania and Spain with a view to overcome the obstacles that hamper the 
application of FD 2008/909/JHA
12
. In fact, Italy, Romania and Spain represent a 
promising test-bed for an assessment of the advances and shortcomings of transfer 
procedures, for two main reasons. Firstly, their prison systems are characterized 
by the highest rate of inmates who are foreign nationals of other Member States, 
which entails remarkable quantitative opportunities for resorting to transfer 
procedures. Secondly, various converging factors - in particular those referring to 
the difficult situation of national penitentiary systems - have led these Member 
States to develop advanced strategies for enhancing the application of FD 
2008/909/JHA. 
The chapter firstly provides an overview of the general features of the FD 
2008/909/JHA and of the state of the art concerning its implementation at the 
national level. Secondly, the analysis considers how the specific distribution of 
powers and responsibilities between the issuing and the executing authorities 
influences the whole mechanism of judicial cooperation and triggers reactions at 
the national level, with a view to secure the effective application of the FD. In 
particular, the chapter builds on the theories which explain the structure of the EU 
policy and normative cycle in a multilayer context - namely the theories of 
Europeanization and domestication - in order to contend that the Member States’ 
compliance with the EU pattern does not only depend on the adoption of adequate 
and formal implementation measures. Instead, a paramount role is played by a 
diversified set of measures, practices and strategies beyond the mere duty of 
implementation of EU secondary law and aiming at adapting domestic legal and 
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institutional scenarios to the challenge of cross-border judicial cooperation. These 
formal and informal solutions often involve basically operational tools, which can 
be considered the silent (but powerful) engines of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition. The analysis will specifically focus on the reasons why these 
mechanisms are important in the domain of prisoners’ transfers.  
Thirdly, the chapter applies this background to selected features of the above 
mentioned selected case studies - namely Italy, Romania and Spain - and provides 
an overview of the main strategies developed by the governmental and judicial 
authorities to cope with the challenges raised by transfer procedures. 
 
 
2. Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and its main provisions. 
The Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters
13
 insisted on the need to re-evaluate the existing 
mechanisms of judicial cooperation related to final decisions on custodial 
sentences. The intention was to possibly replace those procedures with more 
advanced ones, that would lead to the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to the transfer of sentenced persons between the Member States
14
. 
Considering these aspects of the Programme, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
proposed the adoption of a FD
15
. The idea was to introduce a new judicial 
cooperation instrument, called the European enforcement order. The issuing of an 
order by the authorities of a Member State would have allowed the execution of a 
custodial sentence or another measure limiting personal liberty in another Member 
State. More specifically, the proposal identified the executing Member State as 
any Member State of which the sentenced person was a national or where that 
person resided legally on a permanent basis or with which the convict had other 
close links. Only in the latter case, the consent of the sentenced person was 
mandatory for the transfer to take place, while a mere right to express the personal 
opinion was envisaged in all other situations. 
Despite some difficulties due to the opposition expressed by Poland
16
 related to 
the high number of Polish inmates serving their sentence in the prisons of the 
other Member States
17
, a compromise text was eventually approved by the 
Council and FD 2008/909/JHA came into force on 5 December 2008. 
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Within its scope of application, the FD replaces the European Convention on the 
transfer of sentenced persons of 1983 and its Additional Protocol of 1997, the 
Convention on the International Validity of Repressive Judgments of 1970, the 
relevant provisions of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and 
the Convention between the Member States of the Communities States on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences of 1991. 
On the one hand, the purpose of this act is to speed up the transfers of prisoners 
between EU Member States, through a judicial cooperation mechanism that does 
not rest on the consent of either the sentenced person or the national governments 
(recitals 4 and 5). On the other hand, the FD should facilitate the sentenced 
persons’ social reintegration, by allowing them to serve part of their sentence in a 
State with which they have significant family, linguistic, cultural, social, 
economic and other links.
18
 The whole mechanism should respect the fundamental 
rights of the sentenced person (and the constitutional rules of the Member States 
relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom 
of expression in other media.
19
 
For the purposes of the transfer, the final judgment is transmitted by the 
authorities identified as competent by the issuing State to those of the Member 
State of nationality of the sentenced person, or the Member State of nationality 
where they will be deported or any other Member State that consents to the 
forwarding of the judgment (Article 4, paragraph 1)
20
. The judgment is forwarded 
together with a certificate
21
, translated into the official language or one of the 
official languages of the executing State, that provides all the relevant information 
concerning the convict and his/her opinion, the offence, the length of the sentence, 
the decision on the case and the issuing authority (Article 22 (1)
22
. Another 
distinctive aspect is that the sentenced person’s consent is needed unless the 
judgment is forwarded to the Member State of nationality in which they live or to 
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which they will be deported or the Member State to which he has fled or returned 
before the conclusion of the proceedings pending against them or following the 
conviction in the issuing State. In any case, the sentenced person has the right to 
express his / her opinion regarding the transfer and the authority of the issuing 
State must take this into account when deciding whether or not to transfer him/her. 
Furthermore, this opinion must be forwarded to the executing State (Article 6). 
Article 9 provides an exhaustive list of grounds for optional refusal of recognition. 
For instance, the recognition and the execution may be refused where the 
certificate is incomplete or does not correspond to the judgment, the criteria for 
forwarding the judgment and the certificate to the executing Member State are not 
met, the enforcement of the sentence would be contrary to the principle of ne bis 
in idem  or the rule on the abolition of the double criminality requirement applies. 
Partial recognition and execution are allowed (Article 10) and the recognition may 
be postponed should the certificate be incomplete or non-correspondent to the 
judgment (Article 11). 
The competent authority of the executing State is allowed to adapt the foreign 
decision with regard to the duration or nature of the sentence, in order to align 
them with national law. In any case, the adapted sentence cannot aggravate the 
sentenced passed in the issuing State (Article 8). 
Exception made for the case of postponement, the decision must be recognised as 
soon as possible and, in any case, within ninety days from the reception of the 
judgment and the certificate (Article 12 (1) and (2)). 
The transfer takes place no later than 30 days after the final decision on the 
recognition (Article 15 (1)). Should it require the transit through the territory of 
other Member States, their authorities must be informed and must send a notice to 
the issuing State regarding their intention to prosecute or detain the sentenced 
person for offences committed or sentences imposed in their territory (Article 
16(1)(2)(3)). 
As we will consider more in-depth in the next paragraph, the enforcement of the 
sentence is governed by the law of the executing State, including the grounds for 
early or conditional release (Article 17(1) and 3)).  
The Member States were supposed to comply with the FD by 5 December 2011 
(Article 27). In its report of 2014 regarding the state of implementation of the FD, 
the Commission highlighted that only five states – namely, Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom – had transposed it in time. Other 
thirteen had done so when the deadline had already expired, while ten had failed 
to communicate their implementation measures
23
. For its part, the Commission 
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highlighted a number of issues arising from the practice of the national 
authorities. More specifically, the European Commission complained that the 
sentenced person is not always informed as to the start of the transfer procedure. 
As a consequence, he/she cannot provide a personal opinion
24
. Furthermore, the 
Commission criticized the choice made by some States to expand the conditions 
for the adaptation the sentence, to introduce new grounds for refusal or to make 
some of the existing ones optional
25
. Finally, the Commission underlined that 
some States had not set a deadline for national courts to decide on the appeals 
against the transfer decision
26
. Therefore, the Commission expressed some 
dissatisfaction, urging the Member States to fully and consistently transpose the 
FD
27
. 
Scholars have pointed out three main criticalities, namely the lack of a definition 
of the concept of social reintegration, the failure to provide deadlines regarding 
the procedure in the issuing State and the failure to provide an obligation for the 
issuing State to inform the sentenced person of the conditions of detention in the 
executing State
28
. 
These concerns point at the divide between the formal aims of the FD - enhancing 
mutual trust and social rehabilitation - and law in action. It has been highlighted 
that the primary interest of the Member States is to reduce the costs related to the 
detention of foreigners and to get a rid of unwanted Union citizens
29
. 
 
3. Mutual trust and mutual recognition in the EU multi-layer policy cycle: 
from theory to practice. 
Existing literature concerning EU governance has been very often concerned with 
the sword of Damocles hanging over the Member States, in the form of the duty to 
timely and properly transpose EU law in the national legal orders. From a 
complementary perspective, legal scholars have extensively discussed the nature, 
the functioning and the effectiveness of the remedies through which the EU 
oversees compliance with its law in the national arena, with a focus on 
infringement proceedings (Arts 258-260 TFEU) and of the so-called indirect use 
of preliminary references under Art. 267 TFEU. 
In both cases, these studies have analysed the processes of EU law 
implementation and enforcement at the domestic level mainly from a top-down 
perspective, through the lenses of the conformance implementation model. 
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According to this approach, compliance refers to the formal coherence between 
intended and achieved outcomes, that is to say between EU centrally steered rules 
and the formal measures adopted at the domestic level
30
. It follows that, from this 
point of view, a key-indicator for assessing a Member State’s degree compliance 
is the degree through which the centrally decided blueprint is implemented from 
top to bottom. More specifically, with regard to the European Union, the 
conformance model is conceptualized as the EU’s influence over domestic 
choices in a given policy area and has therefore been labeled as Europeanization 
of national legal orders
31
. 
However, the top-down analysis of the Member States’ formal compliance with 
EU law suffers from inherent limits, since it depicts only a small piece of a 
multicolor twisting Rubik’s Cube, where various and continuously evolving 
implementation and enforcement strategies converge towards the attainment of 
shared policy outcomes. The latest evidence of EU governance studies shows that 
the predominant Europeanization perspective wipes out that implementation and 
enforcement are acts of interpretation, where discretion and flexibility within the 
multilevel structure are essential factors for enhancing the Member States’ 
performance. Indeed, the outcomes of the complex EU policy and normative 
cycles largely depend on the domestic authorities’ reactions to centrally-steered 
rules. 
Therefore, recent studies have analyzed the multi-layer normative cycle of the 
Union from the angle of a reversed research approach, namely the performance 
implementation model. This model aims at looking beyond formal national 
performances and tries to capture the complexity and the high degree of interstitial 
differentiation hiding behind the prima facie similarities of national measures of 
implementation of EU law
32
. These ramifications refer to the process of so-called 
domestication, which entails adaptations of EU footprints to the specific features 
of national legal orders and of the political arenas. Domestication processes often 
lead the domestic authorities to non-prescribed or non-recommended policy 
options going beyond formal compliance, thus unveiling the structural lack of 
knowledge on the actual patterns and practices of the Member States when 
transposing EU law and enforcing it.  
As the first studies on selected branches of Union policies demonstrate, clearer 
understanding of the rationale underpinning national measures, as well as of the 
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problem-solving capacity of the domestic authorities is a key-factor for ensuring 
the effective application of EU law.
33
 
This logic is even more compelling when the exercise of criminal law 
enforcement powers is at stake. In fact, the division of competences between the 
Union and the Member States places the domestic authorities at the forefront of 
EU law implementation. This inevitable direct relationship is a distinctive feature 
of the constitutional structure of the Union, and has modeled the EU system of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters accordingly. Actually, the principles of 
mutual trust and mutual recognition heavily rely on the Member States’ reactions 
for securing the effective implementation and application of relevant EU 
secondary law. The golden and quasi-absolute duty of recognizing and executing 
foreign judicial decisions takes the shape of common procedures which get a rid 
of unnecessary formalities, in particular when compared to purely 
intergovernmental instruments of mutual legal assistance. From this perspective, 
mutual recognition - and more specifically the ensuing procedural simplification - 
is a key-trigger for cross-border cooperation, but faces two major challenges, 
namely the strict limits to EU competences and legal differentiation at the 
domestic level. The pressure deriving from these challenges varies greatly, 
basically depending on the scope of the judicial cooperation mechanism 
concerned and the area of criminal law or the stage of the criminal proceedings it 
applies to. In fact, the stricter the constrains to EU law are, the more important it 
is to pre-determine a proper balance between the respective responsibilities of the 
issuing and executing judicial authorities, thereby minimizing the risk of 
centrifugal forces and departures from mutual trust underlying legal 
fragmentation. It follows that, even within the domain of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, mutual recognition allows for a certain degree of flexibility and 
differentiation as to its actual functioning and implementation at the national 
level. Therefore, provided that the minimum common procedural denominator set 
forth by the Union is complied with, this inherently variable approach offers 
leeway to domestic authorities for establishing specific patterns for the application 
of EU law. The strategies and priorities of domestication can become a powerful 
silent engine of judicial cooperation mechanisms. 
The case of FD 2008/909/JHA is particularly illustrative in this regard, as it 
covers the national exclusive competence on the criminal execution phase, where 
fragmentation of procedural and penitentiary regimes reaches its peak. The basic 
assumption of judicial cooperation in criminal matters across the Union is that 
execution of a foreign decision is entrusted to the law of the executing State, in 
the light of the principles of sovereignty and territoriality. However, the issuing 
authority usually retains certain powers, ranging from light equivalence checks to 
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more stringent controls over the activity of the executing authority. For instance, 
some Framework Decisions and Directives stipulate that specific aspects of the 
legal order of the country of origin have to be respected even in the territory of the 
executing State
34
. Moreover, if the fragmentation of national legal orders blocks 
the execution of a foreign decision, the receiving authority will be endowed with 
the power to adjust that decision, in order to reconcile it with its legal order
35
. 
Such adaptations mitigate the automaticity of the judicial cooperation mechanisms 
and may incisively modify the nature and consequences of the decision 
concerned. Therefore, they are usually made conditional upon strict requirements, 
out of which the consent of the issuing State plays a prominent role.  
From this point of view, the FD 2008/909/JHA implements the principle of 
mutual recognition through a peculiar distribution of competences between the 
issuing and the executing authorities. At the time of the negotiations preceding the 
adoption of this act, the comparative analysis of the relevant national laws 
highlighted a considerable variety of means to enforce sentences and of 
alternatives to imprisonment. The level of minimum and maximum penalties, 
prison regimes and prison conditions also revealed major differences. Therefore, 
the wording of the FD was directly influenced by the need to avoid conflicts and 
to build mutual trust in (almost) unexplored areas of criminal procedural law. 
In comparison to other similar instruments, the issuing authority enjoys a wider 
margin of intervention as to the outcomes of the cooperation mechanism, in 
particular with regard to the forwarding of the certificate and to its withdrawal.  
Firstly, this authority must be satisfied that enforcement of the sentence abroad 
will enhance the prisoner’s chances of social rehabilitation and is entitled to 
exercise a power of veto to this respect.
36
 Still, as it will be considered further, the 
actual scope of such resocialization purposes is far from clear, due to both the 
elusive nature of this notion and the emergence of opposing national priorities, 
such as the strive for decreasing the prison population and hidden ambitions of 
transferring to other Member States the burden of unwanted EU migrants. 
The role of the issuing judicial authority is further amplified by the interpretation 
of the first paragraph of Art. 17 of the FD given by the Court of Justice in 
Ognyanov II
37
. This provision endows the executing authority with the primary 
and sole responsibility for governing the enforcement of the sentence issued 
abroad. Nonetheless, it is more than likely that the enforcement has already 
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commenced in the issuing Member State before the judicial cooperation 
mechanism is completed, or even prior to the very first steps of the procedure in 
the issuing State itself. Therefore, the second paragraph urges the executing 
authority to deduct the deprivation of liberty already served in another Member 
State from the total duration of the sentence. Then, the key-question was whether 
this deduction should include an analysis - and the subsequent necessary 
substantive assessment - of both the enforcement regime of the issuing Member 
State and the facts occurred during the first phase of enforcement in order to 
quantify the post-transfer remaining period of detention. The Court considered 
that the FD wards off any overlap of competences: the cross-border enforcement 
of a sentence is the outcome of the separate but complementary efforts of the 
authorities involved
38
. It followed that the notion of enforcement under Art. 17 
refers only to imprisonment - id est enforcement of the sentence - in the executing 
State and to the related legal regime
39
. As a consequence, in the event of a more 
lenient regime in the executing State, any more favourable provision cannot 
operate retroactively. Instead, its scope of application is strictly limited to the 
enforcement within the territory of that State of destination, as all remissions in 
sentence connected to the pre-transfer enforcement are to be considered solely by 
the issuing authority. Having said that, the issuing authority strikes back through 
Art. 17(3), of the FD, which endows it with the discretionary power to withdraw 
the certificate when it does not agree with the executing State’s rules on early or 
conditional release. Again, a de facto power of veto. 
Territoriality and the automaticity of mutual recognition are in principle 
preserved, but the strengthened role of the domestic authorities further contributes 
to trigger national strategies intended to ease the application of this FD besides 
formal implementation measures. 
 
 
4. Mutual trust and mutual recognition through formal and informal 
operational cooperation: the cases of Italy, Romania and Spain  
 
The following subparagraphs are devoted to an overall analysis of the relevant 
Italian, Romanian and Spanish practice concerning FD 2008/909 and to the 
definition of a proper conceptual framework – namely, that of organized 
hypocrisy. The purpose is to point out the discrepancy between law in the books 
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and law in action between the FD and its implementation from two perspectives: 
the alleged automaticity of the transfer mechanism and the aims it actually 
pursues. 
 
4.1. The secret garden of the execution phase. Blind trust, informed trust, agreed 
trust. 
As outlined above, the criminal execution phase is a remarkable example of legal 
fragmentation. Domestic legislations widely vary on various issues, ranging from 
the regime for remission or reduction of sentence to the nature and length of the 
sentence and the alternatives to detention. In principle, these differences should 
not affect mutual trust and do not amount to a ground for refusing recognition of a 
foreign decision. As repeatedly contended by the Court of Justice, judicial 
cooperation must take place regardless of the features of the domestic legal 
regime, even in the event of significant divergences, which would lead a given 
criminal case to a different outcome depending on the Member State responsible 
for it.
40
 Moreover, the means to coordinate the respective legal orders provided by 
the FD 2008/909/JHA itself – the adaptation of the sentence first in line – are 
precisely meant to overcome legal discrepancies and neutralize their implications 
on mutual trust and mutual recognition. 
Notwithstanding this settled theoretical background, legal fragmentation poses 
serious practical challenges to mutual trust. The research developed so far – which 
is actually in line with other empirical studies carried out in this domain and with 
the studies developed in the aftermath of the adoption of the first EU instruments 
implementing the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters –41 has 
revealed that divergences between national legislations is still nowadays capable 
of discouraging mutual confidence. The need to build trust, by increasing 
knowledge on the foreign criminal and procedural law, is a recurring refrain in the 
interviews that we have carried out during the RePers project. To some extent, 
mutual trust is deemed to be inherently and necessarily connected to the 
achievement of a prior and adequate level of awareness of those foreign rules 
which matter the most in a given case. Admittedly, this raises structural concerns 
on the actual grip of mutual recognition mechanisms as they are in principle 
designed, since it unveils the perception that a lack of information amounts to 
imposing to the executing authorities a duty of blind trust. 
This creeping uneasiness with the law in the books of mutual trust has triggered 
some reactions at the national level. The experience of Italy and Romania 
provides some interesting insights on how operational flanking measures can 
facilitate cooperation. These two Member States have developed a significant 
practice in the field of prisoners’ transfers, due to very practical reasons. Actually, 
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statistics show that Romanian nationals represent the largest community of EU 
migrants in Italy. Moreover, the average rate of Romanian inmates detained in 
Italian prisons is more than fifteen times higher than any other EU nationality, 
which means that the number of potential transferees towards Romania is 
exceptionally high.
42
 Therefore, the bilateral relationship between these two 
Member States is particularly advanced and often involves Italy as a sending 
State. The number of transfers is accordingly high, if compared to the average 
flows of cases across Europe.
43
  
Notwithstanding the vast bilateral experience, the analysis of the case files shows 
that the authorities of these Member States are inclined to pull the break of 
uniformed trust. In both States, the Ministries of Justice are central authorities 
transmitting and receiving all active and passive requests for transfer. Therefore, 
they took up responsibility for this situation, and, at a first stage, they decided to 
agree on some solutions that could be easily implemented. In particular, they 
agreed to prepare translated versions – along with a brief explanation – of key-
provisions of the respective legal orders, mainly in relation to alternatives to 
detention and remission and reduction of sentences, to be included in or attached 
to the certificates. Moreover, they provided each other translated explanations on 
some recurring hurdles stemming from national procedural rules, such as Italian 
techniques of considering accumulation of several penalties or the set of judicial 
remedies available at the domestic level. Surprisingly enough, these efforts to 
strengthen what we might call an informed trust have always been conducted 
through bilateral contacts between the ministerial authorities, whereas no role has 
been apparently played by the judicial authorities that the EU law endows with 
coordination tasks and operational support, namely liason magistrates. Instead, the 
role of the liason magistrate has proven to be extremely successful in the 
framework of the relationship between Italy and Spain. The on-line survey and the 
interviews that we carried out demonstrate that these magistrates are the main 
reference point for any potential obstacle or request for clarification regarding 
how the procedure works at the domestic level. This is probably due to the 
different institutional setting. According to its national law of implementation, 
Spain opted for a highly decentralized model of managing judicial cooperation 
with other Member States, minimizing the role of the national and the Catalonian 
governmental authorities, while Italy and Romania have reserved a key-
coordination role to their central authorities. 
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In any event, the ever-increasing flow of cases between Italy and Romania – along 
with the ensuing criticalities – brought the central authorities to move a step 
further. In 2015, they decided to launch a round of bilateral negotiations, which 
eventually led them to sign an informal agreement, called memorandum of 
understanding between Italy and Romania on the application of FD 
2008/909/JHA. This memorandum builds on a previous bilateral agreement 
between Italy and Romania, signed in 2005 and entered into force on 11 April 
2006. That agreement was meant to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation in a 
pre-FD 2008/909/JHA legal scenario and followed on the concerns of a massive 
inflow of Romanian nationals to Italy in the aftermath of the imminent accession 
of Romania to the EU. In accordance with Art. 26(2) and (4) of the FD, Italy 
made a declaration pointing out its will to continue to apply the agreement at 
issue, as long as it facilitated further the procedures for the enforcement of 
custodial sentences. However, at the time of transposition in Romania, by law 300 
of 15 November 2013, the government did not notify the intention to continue to 
rely on the existing bilateral agreement. This urged a reconsideration of the 
bilateral relationship with Italy and eventually led to the new memorandum of 
understanding, even though the Italian law on the execution of the bilateral treaty 
of 2006 is still formally in force. The legal basis for the new text is Art. 26(3) FD, 
which allows the Member States to conclude “bilateral or multilateral agreements 
or arrangements after 5 December 2008 in so far as such agreements or 
arrangements allow the provisions of this FD to be extended or enlarged and help 
to simplify or facilitate further the procedures for the enforcement of sentences”. 
The memorandum itself was later updated in 2017, following a second round of 
negotiations. However, this revised version has never been formally signed by the 
parties, to such an extent that the Romanian authorities deem negotiations to be 
still pending.
44
 Although it might appear a bilateral international agreement 
concluded in a simplified form (actually, it has been formally signed by the 
Ministries of Justice of the parties, but not ratified), the memorandum of 
understanding is deemed to provide mere soft guidance in the implementation of 
the FD. Basically, it is a collection of best practices and solutions which Italy and 
Romania agreed on to face shared and recurring challenges when dealing with 
transfer procedures. 
Regardless of its legal nature, the memorandum of understanding is a clear 
example of how proper implementation of EU law - in specific cases - can trigger 
the problem-solving capacity of the Member States and urge initiatives which go 
well-beyond the formal activity of transposition. To be honest, from a purely EU 
law perspective the signing of this document could raise concerns, on two main 
grounds. Firstly, it reiterates a primarily intergovernmental approach to judicial 
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cooperation, where mutual trust is not conceived as a key-premises of the whole 
mechanism, rather a consequence of a prior negotiation. If we look at this 
document from a systemic perspective, it can amount to threatening mutual trust 
as a general principle of EU law, because of its centrifugal potential. In fact, if this 
approach was to be expanded to other areas of judicial cooperation or replicated 
by other Member States, we would experience a structural shift from informed 
trust - which is actually provided for and to a certain extent urged by EU law, as 
all relevant secondary legislation allow for direct contacts and exchange of 
information between the domestic judicial authorities involved - to agreed trust, 
which means conditioned and inherently limited trust.  
Secondly, even though the FD provides a specific legal basis, the signing of this 
memorandum marks a departure from the ordinary schemes and methods of 
implementation of EU Directives and Framework Decisions. It fragments 
implementation into as many pieces as the specific cases of bilateral inter-State 
relationships (allegedly) deserving measures ad hoc are. Again, if we consider this 
practiced from a general point of view, it can be highly critical, as neither the 
Commission was involved, nor the memorandum was communicated and shared 
with this institution. By the means of a memorandum, the parties may introduce 
new conditions and constraints to mutual trust and mutual recognition or depart 
from the expected EU pattern, without any control. In fact, it is for the parties to 
establish whether the bilateral arrangement actually facilitates judicial 
cooperation, which does not necessarily mean that it secures the full effectiveness 
of the FD. In principle, from a domestic perspective, an additional condition for 
performing a transfer could be considered in line with Art. 26(3) FD, because it 
fades away the national judicial authorities’ mistrust or distrust, even though it 
makes a transfer procedure more complicated. An illustrative example of this 
dynamic is the Romanian approach to the translation of the Italian judicial 
custodial sentences attached to the certificate. As agreed in the memorandum of 
understanding, the Romanian authorities always ask for a translation of such a 
judicial decision in its entirety, regardless of the wording of the FD. In fact, Art. 
23(3) provides three limits to unnecessary translations. First, the Member State 
concerned must notify the Council of its will to allow its judicial authorities to 
seek for a translated version of the custodial sentence. Second, in any event, this 
translation can be requested only after consultations and in cases when the 
certificate is not enough to decide on the enforcement of a sentence. Lastly, the 
translation must be limited to the essential parts of the judicial decision at issue. 
Any departure from these criteria adds unnecessary formalities and burdens to 
mutual trust and mutual recognition, thereby raising serious concerns as to its 
actual compatibility with the FD and the general principles judicial cooperation is 
modeled upon.  
As a final remark, the memorandum under consideration lacks procedural and 
substantive transparency. On the one hand, it is not clear how negotiations were 
held, who took part in them and under which circumstances this document can be 
amended. On the other hand, both the Ministries of Justice involved acknowledge 
the existence of this memorandum, whereas the text is not publicly available. 
Limited hints on its content can be derived from some circular letters issued by 
the Italian Ministry of Justice and addressed to the national judicial authorities.
45
 
These circular letters are available on-line, but then again they only make indirect 
references to the original document. The lack of accountability can be highly 
critical in this domain, because a transfer impacts a prisoner (and his/her family)’s 
life heavily and calls for appropriate safeguards and remedies, in particular in 
relation to the evaluation of the prospects of social rehabilitation carried out by 
the authorities involved. Informality and secrecy of the overall approach to a 
cross-border transfers are likely to undermine individual guarantees. 
 
 
4.2. The aim of the Framework Decision and the organized hypocrisy of the 
national legislatures and governments  
Complex structures such as international organizations and States are usually 
assessed in light of the outcome of their action, such as a UN Security Council 
resolution or a law passed by a national parliament. At the same time, the social 
context in which these entities perform their activities is not irrelevant, as it 
requires those outcomes to be consistent with the political, economic, cultural 
interests expressed by that context. Nonetheless, the social context of reference is 
never uniform and, therefore, it cannot express just one relevant interest. 
As a consequence, the coexistence of different and often conflicting interests 
decouples the organization of the above-mentioned structures. On the one hand, 
one can identify a formal organization, whose purpose is to keep up appearances 
that all the interests have been taken into account and held in adequate 
consideration; on the other hand, there is an informal organization, whose activity 
aims at achieving only the most prominent interest or limited set of interests. 
This situation has been labelled organized hypocrisy. Despite what the word 
hypocrisy might suggest, the existing literature on the topic does not interpret it in 
a negative way. As a matter of fact, it is not endowed with moral connotations, 
rather with an empirical essence. Therefore, organized hypocrisy is not 
blameworthy, because it must be interpreted as the only model of organization that 
makes it possible for these complex structures to exist and work. 
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This conceptual framework has already been applied in relation to the action of 
the European Union and of its Member States in order to blame them for some 
inconsistencies in their action, which is not consistent with the reference model. 
For instance, the inability of the Union to fully apply its export control rules and 
the choice of several national governments to favour the trade of weapons with 
Libya, despite the actions of the regime of Muhammar Gaddafi were in clear 
contrast with their basic values, has been criticized for prioritizing mere economic 
gain.
46
 Other scholars have highlighted the existing conflict between the EU’s 
rhetoric regarding sea rescue missions and its actions, the primary aim of which is 
to strengthen the control over maritime borders and to combat illegal 
immigration.
47 More generally, concerns have been raised on the divide between 
the aspiration to ensure protection for migrants and the practices aimed at 
preventing or, in any case, making the access to the EU very difficult.
48
 
This conceptual framework can be extended to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and, properly, the transfer of prisoners. Some legal scholars have 
underlined that FD 2008/909/JHA leaves aside the rhetoric of social reintegration 
and rather aims at removing unwanted subjects from the national territory or 
containing the costs related to the detention of foreign citizens.
49 Others have 
stressed that the rehabilitative function could be countered by the will of the 
prisoners to request the transfer in order only to get a reduction in the duration of 
the sentence in the executing State.
50
 
The analysis of Italian, Romanian and Spanish practice seems to confirm these 
concerns. While the FD refers to social rehabilitation several times and the 
national implementing laws reflect this clear-cut approach, several factors unveil 
the hypocrisy underpinning the multi-layer normative cycle on prisoners’ transfer. 
Firstly, the wording of the FD has remained de facto dead letter. Taking into 
consideration the national laws of transposition, it has not lead to the 
establishment of neither a tool to assess the opportunities of social reintegration, 
nor a mechanism to analyze the effectiveness of reintegration. Therefore, on the 
one hand, all the three legal orders considered fail to provide an adequate ex ante 
activity to establish if and how likely the reintegration of the detainee through its 
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transfer might be; on the other hand, there is no way to check whether or not the 
purpose of reintegration has been achieved. 
Secondly, many interviews confirm that the governmental authorities’ main 
ambition is actually to use transfer procedures for alternative purposes, such as 
getting rid of unwanted migrants and mitigating prison overcrowding. The Italian 
case is striking in this regard. At the time of the expiry of the implementation 
deadline, Italy was under the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights, 
due to a series of applications complaining on the degrading detention conditions 
the prisoners were subject to in many prisons. This contributed to put pressure on 
the Government, which managed to transpose the FD in time. In the Italian 
experience, it was the first timely implementation of an act concerning judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Since then, it has remained the sole one.  
In addition, the negotiations of the above-mentioned Memorandum of 
Understanding were urged by the Italian Ministry of Justice, due to the specific 
interest of increasing the number of transfers to Romania, the Member State of 
nationality of the largest group of EU prisoners in Italy. In the same vein, as from 
2015, the Ministry of Justice launched regular screenings of the prison population, 
with a view to identify potential transferees. The prison administration was asked 
to spread a form among the detainees, to inform them of the possibility of being 
transferred and to collect their opinion. The problem with this initiative - which is 
still ongoing on a yearly basis - is that all cases where the prisoner expressed 
his/her (usually uniformed and vague) consent were sent to the competent 
prosecution office and later processed by the central authority. This unselective 
approach is illustrative of the governmental priorities and has caused several 
shortcomings. It has led to an overload of procedures, most of which have ended 
in nothing, because of factors such as the limited length of the sentence remaining 
to be served, the dissent later on expressed by the prisoner, the negative 
assessment of the actual chances of social rehabilitation on the part of the 
Romanian authorities, which often declined recognition. 
Thirdly, the lack of instruments for assessing the chances of social rehabilitation 
particularly affects the activity of the judicial authorities involved. Their scrutiny 
is usually conducted on the basis of generic and not carefully verified 
assumptions, such as the knowledge of the language of the host State, the 
presence of family links, past work experiences. The analysis of the case files has 
shows that underestimation of the prisoner’s situation is a recurring feature, to the 
detriment of individualization of punishment, which is meant to be a key-premises 
for a successful path of social rehabilitation. To some extent, this finds an 
explanation in the survey and the interviews, because many judicial authorities 
point out that they lack adequate tools and resources (ranging from time to the 
actual availability of evidence) either to support the prisoner’s statements or to 
better understand his/her economic, social and family context. In particular, they 
complain that they can only perform a negative assessment, which means that 
they can only ascertain the absence of grounds for preventing the filing of a 
request for transfer.
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These three circumstances seem to confirm the coexistence of different and 
conflicting interests related to the implementation and application of the FD. The 
purpose of transferring sentenced persons from a Member State to another should 
lie in the social rehabilitation of these individuals. However, at least as far as the 
Italian, Romanian and Spanish cases, social rehabilitation is taken only into very 
limited account and seems to play a role only on paper. The practice related to the 
FD proves that the Member States may be able to use it in order to achieve some 
different prevailing objectives. Considering the Italian case, one should consider 
how the Italian authorities have transposed and applied the FD in order to tackle 
the issues concerning prison overcrowding. 
In the light of the organized-hypocrisy conceptual framework, the Member States’ 
choice to implement the FD for the (different) reasons they deem to be important 
can be formally acceptable. From a legal (and a political) point of view, provided 
that the EU pattern is complied with formally, nothing could prevent them from 
misconceiving the rationale of the FD. However, the unclear – where not 
neglected – status of social rehabilitation of the sentenced persons hampers its 
role. Therefore, it is now regarded as a general purpose to which only limited 
practical outcome can be attached.   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
 
FD 2008/909 has allowed the EU legislature to replace the preexisting the 
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. In the relations between the 
Member States of the European Union, the intergovernmental footprint of the 
1983 Convention has left room to a new model based on the principle of mutual 
recognition of foreign decisions in criminal matters. 
This change should have made to transfer convicts between the Member States 
easier and faster, by pursuing at the same time the social rehabilitation of the 
sentenced persons. However, the practice and the strategies developed by the 
national authorities with a view to implement this mechanism raise criticism, both 
from a quantitative and a qualitative points of view. 
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 Notwithstanding these structural deficiencies, operational cooperation instruments can sort out 
to be effective ways out of current blocks. This is confirmed by the Spanish experience. There, the 
judicial authorities tasked with a transfer procedure usually resort to available EU databases and to 
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While the number of transfers is slowly increasing, the domestication process of 
FD 2008/909 has led to some dubious policies that ensure formal compliance with 
the supranational obligations, but nevertheless do not seem to be consistent with 
the purpose of the FD and with the ambition of a quasi-automatic judicial 
cooperation mechanism. As demonstrated by the practice of some Member States 
such as Italy, the mechanism set up by the FD has triggered domestic strategies to 
prioritise different objectives from the one of social rehabilitation, namely to 
address the problem of prison overcrowding. This is not forbidden by EU law, and 
the conceptual framework of organized hypocrisy helps understand this 
phenomenon, but it raises a number of questions regarding the actual grip of 
mutual trust and the role that social rehabilitation may actually play when it 
comes to the application of the national laws of implementation. It is contended 
that the misconception of the objectives underpinning FD 2008/909 affects a 
genuine approach to the principle of mutual trust. It favours a unilateral approach 
to judicial this cooperation mechanism, whereby the national authorities aim at 
disposing of unwanted prisoners, rather than cooperating for the benefit of the 
individual and towards achieving a higher level of security in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.  
